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STATEMENT OF INTEREST 1
UNITE HERE is a labor union that represents 270,000 working people
across Canada and the United States. Its members work in the hotel, gaming, food
service, and airport industries, among others.
UNITE HERE members face a dire affordable housing crisis, particularly in
high-cost areas like Los Angeles. The housekeepers, cooks, restaurant servers, and
retail workers whom UNITE HERE represents live in destination cities where
short-term rental (“STR”) businesses like Airbnb and Homeaway.com are most
active and where their effect on housing affordability is most pernicious. These
companies and their owners have profited by violating local laws designed to
regulate the conversion of residential housing to commercial transient occupancy
units. The effect in places like Santa Monica has been a reduction in the amount of
available housing and increases in rental costs. The affordability crisis to which
Airbnb, Homeaway.com and other STR brokers contribute has forced UNITE
HERE members to choose between paying an even larger share of their family
income on housing or living further and further from the urban core, where they
have built communities and where their workplaces are located.
Airbnb’s business model also gives it a competitive advantage over hotels,
which follow local zoning laws and other regulatory measures covering public
accommodations such as the Americans with Disabilities Act. UNITE HERE
believes that all forms of visitor accommodations should operate on a level playing
1

No counsel for a party has authored this brief in whole or in part, and no party or
counsel for a party has made a monetary contribution intended to fund the
preparation or submission of the brief. No person other than amicus or its counsel
has made a monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief.
Fed. R. App. P. 29(a)(4)(E). All parties have consented to the filing of this brief.

1
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field, and that the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”) was not intended to
“give online businesses an unfair advantage over their real-world counterparts.”
Fair Housing Council v. Roommates.com LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1164-65 n.15 (9th
Cir. 2008) (en banc).
INTRODUCTION
Airbnb and Homeaway.com (the “STR Brokers”) 2 claim that CDA Section
230 shields them from liability for brokering and profiting from illegal commercial
transactions renting unregistered STRs in the City of Santa Monica. The panel in
this case, and all of the other courts that have addressed the issue, recognized this
as an unprecedented and dangerous attempt to extend CDA immunity well beyond
its language or purpose. HomeAway.com, Inc. v. City of Santa Monica, 918 F.3d
676, 680 (9th Cir. 2019); Airbnb, Inc. v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 217
F.Supp.3d 1066, 1071 (N.D. Cal. 2016); Airbnb, Inc. v. City of Boston, —
F.Supp.3d—, 2019 WL 1981043, at * 7 (May 3, 2019). There is no conflict
between the panel’s straightforward application of Section 230’s language to the
STR Brokers’ commercial activity and the law of this or any other circuit.
The real-world implications of the STR Brokers’ business model are clear.
Airbnb and other STR Brokers have contributed greatly to the housing
affordability crisis affecting Santa Monica and other popular destination cities, by
facilitating the unlawful conversion of residential housing units into transient
accommodations. The STR Brokers’ effect on housing availability and rent is
well-documented, and supports reasonable regulations like Santa Monica’s.
2

Airbnb and Homeaway.com call themselves “platforms,” evoking the image of
neutral scaffolding for activity engaged in by others. But this is not an accurate
description of these companies’ business model, which relies on direct involvement
in the provision and booking of STRs. The more accurate term for this role is
“brokers”: companies that arrange transactions between a buyer and a seller for a
commission when the deal is executed.
2
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Section 230 is not an impediment to cities prohibiting the STR Brokers from
booking and collecting fees for illegal commercial transactions.
ARGUMENT
I.

Airbnb and Other STR Brokers Fuel the Housing Affordability Crisis.
Since their inception, the STR Brokers’ business model has been predicated

on violating local zoning laws regulating STRs. The companies’ carefully crafted
public images convey the sense that those who list STRs are ordinary homeowners
sharing a room with a visitor, or renting their house while they are away on
vacation. But in fact, while such home-sharing listings do exist, they represent a
miniscule amount of revenues generated in places like Los Angeles. Instead, STR
Brokers transact largely with investment-property owners renting out entire units
of housing as part of commercial STR portfolios.
A 2015 study of Airbnb’s impact in Los Angeles, for example, found that
Airbnb listings for shared rooms accounted for less than one quarter of one percent
of Airbnb’s revenue. Instead, ninety percent of Airbnb revenue came from listings
of entire housing units. 3 Commercial property management companies listing
multiple units for rent earned the lion’s share of AirBnB revenue. 4 A subsequent
study conducted by CBRE Hotels’ Americas Research found that multi-unit

3

Roy Samaan, “Airbnb, Rising Rent and the Housing Crisis in Los Angeles,” LOS
ANGELES ALLIANCE FOR A NEW ECONOMY (March 2015), at p. 9, at
https://www.laane.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Airbnb-Final.pdf.
4

Roy Samaan, “Short-Term Rentals and LA’s Lost Housing,” LOS ANGELES
ALLIANCE FOR A NEW ECONOMY (August 24, 2015), at p. 2, at:
http://www.laane.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Short-Term_RentalsLAsLost_Housing.pdf.

3
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Airbnb listings increased by 87% in Los Angeles between 2015 and 2016, and
represented fully 81% of Airbnb revenue in 2016. 5
These trends are mirrored in other cities. McGill University researchers
found that 66% of revenue ($435 million) and 45% of all New York City Airbnb
reservations in 2017 were illegal under New York State law. The researchers
estimate that Airbnb listings had removed between 7,000 and 13,500 units of
housing from New York City’s long-term rental market, including 5,600 entirehome listings that were available as STRs 240 days or more during the year. 6 The
CBRE study mentioned earlier found that multi-unit, entire-home operations were
the fastest growing Airbnb segment in terms of the number of hosts, units, and
revenue generated in 2016, and represented $1.8 billion in Airbnb revenues that
year. Property owners listing 10 or more units represented a quarter of all multiunit hosts nationally, generating $175 million in revenue. 7
As the STR market has come to be dominated by commercial real-estate
companies with multi-unit portfolios, sub-industries have emerged. STR operators
hire property management services that promise to maximize revenues, offer
professional photography of listed units, perform maintenance services, and

5

CBRE Hotels’ Americas Research, “Hosts with Multiple Units – A Key Driver of
Airbnb Growth A Comprehensive National Review Including a Spotlight on 13
U.S. Markets” (March 2017), at p. 14, at: https://www.ahla.com/sites/
default/files/CBRE_AirbnbStudy_2017.pdf.
6

David Wachsmuth et al., “The High Cost of Short-Term Rentals in New York
City,” McGill University School of Urban Planning (January 30, 2018), at p. 2, at:
https://www.mcgill.ca/newsroom/channels/news/high-cost-short-term-rentals-newyork-city-284310.

7

CBRE Hotels’ Americas Research, supra, at p. 4.

4

Case: 18-55367, 07/11/2019, ID: 11361302, DktEntry: 109, Page 9 of 22

restock household items. 8 Airbnb operators hire cleaning services specializing in
STRs, 9 and companies like AirDNA and Everbooked offer operators data analytics
designed to identify optimal price and occupancy targets. 10 Due to the profits at
stake, illegal STR schemes are often large-scale and sophisticated. 11
The conversion of housing units to tourist STRs has had the effect that
standard economics would predict—the reduction in housing supply has resulting
in an increase in rents. The McGill University study of New York City estimated a
1.4% increase in median rent over a three-year period due to Airbnb, with greater
increases occurring in trendy neighborhoods in Brooklyn. 12 A study of Boston
found that each standard deviation increase in Airbnb listings was associated with
a 0.4% increase in asking rents. 13
A national study published by the National Bureau of Economic Research
(“NBER”) found that in low owner-occupancy cities like Santa Monica, each 1%

8

See, e.g., https://www.airconcierge.net/; https://guestable.com/los-angeles/.

9

See, e.g., https://maidthis.com/Airbnb-cleaning/; https://www.tidy.com/Airbnb/.

10

See, e.g,, https://www.airdna.co; https://www.everbooked.com/.

11

See, e.g., Luis Ferre-Sadurni, Inside the Rise and Fall of a Multimillion-Dollar
Airbnb Scheme, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2019, at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/
23/nyregion/airbnb-nyc-law.html?login=email&auth=login-email; Paris Martineau,
How 9 People Built an Illegal $5M Airbnb Empire in New York, WIRED, June 24,
2019, at: https://www.wired.com/story/how-9-people-built-illegal-5m-airbnbempire-new-york/.
12

David Wachsmuth et al., supra, at p. 2.

13

Keren Horn & Mark Merante, “Is home sharing driving up rents? Evidence from
Airbnb in Boston,” 38 JOURNAL OF HOUSING ECONOMICS 14-24 (December 2017).

5
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increase in Airbnb listings is associated with a .024% increase in rent. 14 While this
might not sound like much, consider that Airbnb rentals increased by an average of
27% annually in Santa Monica between 2010 and 2018, according to data analytics
company AirDNA, 15 and that the City’s median move-in rent was $3,200 per
month for a two-bedroom unit in 2018.16 Applying NBER’s formula and
conservatively assuming a 27% increase in listings annually, Airbnb was
responsible for nearly 10% of the median rent increase for a two-bedroom
apartment in Santa Monica between 2010 and 2018, or approximately $1,400 per
year in additional rent payments. 17 This impact is in line with other cities. For
example, New York City’s Comptroller determined that Airbnb had been
responsible for nearly 10% of the total rent increase in that City between 2009 and
2017, meaning that “renters citywide paid a whopping $616 million in additional
rent in 2016 due to the exponential growth of Airbnb listings.” 18

14

Kyle Barron, Edward Kung, Davide Proserpio, “The Sharing Economy and
Housing Affordability: Evidence from Airbnb,” NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC
RESEARCH (April 1, 2018), at https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3006832.
15

https://www.airdna.co/market-data/app/us/california/santa-monica/overview.

16

Santa Monica Rent Control Board, 2018 Annual Report, at p. 14, at:
https://www.smgov.net/uploadedFiles/Department s/Rent_Control/Reports/
Annual_Reports/2018%20Annual%20Report%20FINAL.pdf
17

See Santa Monica Rent Control Board, 2010 Annual Report, at p. 4, at
https://www.smgov.net/uploadedFiles/Departments/Rent_Control/Reports/Annual
_Reports/Annual_Report_10.pdf (median monthly rental for two-bedroom
apartment in 2010 was $2,000).
18

New York City Comptroller Scott M. Stringer, “Comptroller Stringer Report:
NYC Renters Paid an Additional $616 Million in 2016 Due to Airbnb” (May 2,
2018), at https://comptroller.nyc.gov/newsroom/comptroller-stringer-report-nycrenters-paid-an-additional-616-million-in-2016-due-to-Airbnb/.
6
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In short, “because of Airbnb, absentee landlords are moving their properties
out of the long-term rental and for-sale markets and into the short-term rental
market.” 19
II.

Airbnb Is More Than A “Platform” For Buyers and Sellers.
The STR Brokers have not been passive by-standers to these impacts. They

take a percentage of each booking and, as a profit-making enterprises, have an
interest in expanding STRs in destination cities like Santa Monica. STR Brokers
have not been satisfied with the role of a mere “platform” for third-party
transactions. Airbnb actively partners with hosts in many ways, and uses the data
that it gleans from participants in its venture to target marketing, expand its
services, and increase its hosts’ revenue yield (in which it shares).
Airbnb, for example, provides “host insurance”—primary coverage for
liability claims up to $1 million—to all Airbnb operators. Airbnb’s role as
insurance intermediary is not elective: “[b]y agreeing to list a property, or
continuing to list a property, on Airbnb you agree to be covered under the Host
Protection Insurance program.” 20 Airbnb enters into other commercial
relationships with hosts, guests, and other companies, from the mundane, such as
providing professional photography services that will “make your listing stand out
and can help you get booked more often” 21 to more complex business offerings
such as “Airbnb at Work,” which “consolidate[s] travel info and expensing in one
19

Kyle Barron, Edward Kung, and Davide Proserpio, “Research: When Airbnb
Listings in a City Increase, So Do Rent Prices,” HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW, April
17, 2019, available at: https://hbr.org/2019/04/research-when-airbnb-listings-in-acity-increase-so-do-rent-prices.
20

https://www.Airbnb.com/host-protection-insurance.

21

https://www.Airbnb.com/professional_photography.

7
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place.” 22 Airbnb offers “Airbnb Plus”— “a new selection of only the highest
quality homes.” 23 In order to be accepted, the STR operator must permit Airbnb to
“complet[e] a home visit with a third-party inspector” 24 and pass “a 100+ point
quality inspection[.]” 25
Airbnb has a Data Science and Analytics Department, which handles the
massive amount of data that Airbnb collects from both guests and STR operators.
The Department, for example, has developed “a machine learning model that
learns our hosts’ preferences for accommodation requests based on their past
behavior,” and Airbnb uses the “billions of data points” that it collects to suggest
price points to its hosts. 26 Using host addresses, Airbnb can conduct sophisticated
analyses of optimal search results, based on guests’ searches and their ultimate
booking decision. 27 Airbnb conducts “offline” tests of host data—location, price,

22

https://www.Airbnbforwork.com/resources/the-Airbnb-dashboard-your-travelmanagement-success-tool?CO=N-CO-3-2-1&leadId=0.

23

https://www.Airbnb.com/plus.

24

https://www.Airbnb.com/help/article/2195/Airbnb-plus-program-terms-andconditions.

25

https://www.Airbnb.com/plus.

26

Ellen Huet, “How Airbnb Uses Big Data And Machine Learning To Guide Hosts
To The Perfect Price,” FORBES (June 5, 2015), at https://www.forbes.com/sites/
ellenhuet/2015/06/05/how-Airbnb-uses-big-data-and-machine-learning-to-guidehosts-to-the-perfect-price/#1b3fda206d49.
27

Maxim Charkov, Riley Newman, & Jan Overgoor, “Location Relevance
at Airbnb” (May 1, 2013), at: https://medium.com/Airbnb-engineering/locationrelevance-at-Airbnb-12c004247b07.

8
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listing style, architecture—to develop the search tools that personalize results for
the website’s users online. 28
Airbnb’s payment processing is done “in-house” through a wholly owned
subsidiary. Airbnb v. City of Boston, 2019 WL 1981043, at *1. This payment
processing system has evolved, so that it is now able to handle complex currency
transactions in the 191 countries in which Airbnb operates. 29 Airbnb’s payment
operation also uses hosts’ location to collect and remit occupancy taxes in 400
taxing jurisdictions around the world. 30
So Airbnb is not a mere “platform” for the independent exchanges of buyers
and sellers. It actively shapes the market for STR rentals, and brokers the
commercial STR transactions from which it profits directly.
III.

The Panel Decision Does Not Conflict With Circuit or Supreme Court
Law.
The STR Brokers argue that in prohibiting them from carrying out illegal

booking transactions, the Ordinance violates Section 230 by “penaliz[ing] the
Platforms if they fail to screen third-party rental listings that are not registered and
compliant with local law before guests ‘book’ reservations for those listings.”

28

See, e.g., Mihajlo Grbovic et al., “Listing Embeddings in Search Ranking”
(March 13, 2018), at https://medium.com/Airbnb-engineering/listing-embeddingsfor-similar-listing-recommendations-and-real-time-personalization-in-search601172f7603e.
29

Angela Zhu & Karen Kim, Airbnb Payments Engineering, “Scaling Airbnb’s
Payment Platform” (Sept. 12, 2016), at: https://medium.com/airbnb-engineering/
scaling-airbnbs-payment-platform-43ebfc99b324.

30

“Airbnb collects landmark $1 Billion in hotel and tourism taxes” (December 6,
2018 at: https://press.airbnb.com/en-us/airbnb-collects-landmark-1-billion-inhotel-and-tourism-taxes-2/.

9
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Appellants’ Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc (“App. Pet.”), at 2. The
panel correctly rejected this argument.
The Ordinance does not “penalize” the STR Brokers for a “failure to screen”
but for participating in an unlawful economic transaction. No court has held that
the regulation of an economic transaction—including one that is consummated
online—“treats” the provider of an interactive computer service as a “publisher”
merely because that economic transaction came about as the result of published
content. Instead, this and other courts have made clear that regulating economic
transactions and contracts is distinct from regulating an interactive computer
service provider as a publisher. Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1107 (9th
Cir. 2009) (holding company liable as “counterparty to a contract . . . does not seek
to hold Yahoo liable as a publisher or speaker of third-party content”); City of
Chicago, Ill. v. Stubhub, Inc., 624 F.3d 363, 366 (7th Cir. 2010) (Section 230
irrelevant to ordinance imposing tax on resale of tickets at premium since
ordinance “does not depend on who ‘publishes’ any information or is a
‘speaker’”); Airbnb v. City of Boston, 2019 WL 1981043, at *7.
The fact that purely economic regulation might be a “but for” cause of the
website’s decision to engage in subsequent publishing functions—such as
monitoring listings or deciding not to publish them—does not mean that Section
230 is implicated. Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 846, 853 (9th Cir. 2016)
(fact that online posting was a “but for” cause of rape resulting from response to it
did not shield company from “duty to warn” liability, since “[p]ublishing activity is
a but-for cause of just about everything Model Mayhem is involved in . . . [i]t is an
internet publishing business”). To hold otherwise would expand Section 230’s
reach far beyond what Congress intended. Id.; Homeaway.com, 918 F.3d at 682.
As the panel recognized, third-party listings do not contain the addresses of
the units for rent as a matter of policy. Homeaway.com, 918 F.3d at (“[T]he only
10
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monitoring that appears necessary in order to comply with the Ordinance relates to
incoming requests to complete a booking transaction—content that, while resulting
from the third-party listings, is distinct, internal, and nonpublic.”). The STR
Brokers could “scrutinize” their third-party listings as much as they wanted, but
they would not find the information necessary to determine whether the listing is
registered. Airbnb does not publish host addresses. It maintains that information
offline and performs complex analyses of the information to establish optimal price
points, identify areas of marketing and growth, and remit occupancy taxes.
Airbnb’s Data Science and Analytics Department is more than able to perform the
small-batch data comparison between host addresses and Santa Monica registry
units that the Ordinance requires.
An STR operator listing on Airbnb’s site is assured that “[y]our listing’s
address will only be shown to guests with a confirmed reservation. In public
search results, we only show an approximate location for your listing.” 31 In fact,
Airbnb prohibits anyone using the public portions of the website from posting any
“[c]ontent that is sufficient to identify a listing’s location[.]” 32 Instead, a host
provides Airbnb with the listing’s actual address when it is creating the listing. 33
The precise address and identifying contact information does not show up on the
website until the booking is complete. This policy may be animated by Airbnb’s

31

“Is my listing’s address visible on Airbnb?” at https://www.Airbnb.com/help/
article/1502/is-my-listing-s-address-visible-on-Airbnb.
32

“What is Airbnb’s Content Policy?” at https://www.Airbnb.com/help/
article/546/what-is-Airbnb-s-content-policy.
33

See “How do I edit my listing’s address or map location?” at https://www.Airbnb
.com/help/article/478/how-do-i-edit-my-listing-s-address-or-map-location.

11
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concern for “personal safety risk[s] to an Airbnb community member.” 34 More
likely, Airbnb and other STR Brokers do it so that they remain in control of the
booking from which they profit.
The conduct at issue—comparing addresses contained in two data sets to
determine overlap—thus takes place outside of any “publication” on the interactive
computer service that the STR Brokers claim gives them expansive CDA
immunity. See Internet Brands, 824 F.3d at 853 (“actual knowledge . . . from an
outside source of information” took claims outside of Section 230);
Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1171 (noting that to “provide immunity every time a
website uses data initially obtained from third parties would eviscerate [the
statute]”).
The STR Brokers and their amici take issue with the panel’s treatment of the
“distinct, internal, and nonpublic” data that the Ordinance requires them to
compare to Santa Monica’s registry. The STR Brokers argue that by requiring
them to review host addresses (which are not part of the host listing) and compare
them to the City’s registry, the Ordinance “compels monitoring of third-party
content, which even the panel acknowledged was a protected publisher function.”
App. Pet., at 16. But that misrepresents both the panel’s decision and this Circuit’s
interpretation of Section 230. The panel recognized that while making this
comparison “is ‘monitoring’ third-party content in the most basic sense, such
conduct cannot be fairly classified as ‘publication’ of third-party content” under
Section 230. Homewaway.com, 918 F.3d at 682-83. And in this Circuit, Section
230 applies only to information furnished “under circumstances in which a
reasonable person in the position of the service provider . . . would conclude that

34

https://www.Airbnb.com/help/article/546/what-is-Airbnb-s-content-policy.

12
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the information was provided for publication on the Internet.” Batzel v. Smith, 333
F.3d 1018, 1032-34 (9th Cir. 2003). Pre-booking “review” of host addresses that
are provided under an express promise that they will not made public does not
implicate any “publisher” role.
The STR Brokers’ other argument is that the Ordinance “in operation and
effect . . . forces [them] to remove third-party content.”” Homeaway.com, 918
F.3d at 683. Their argument is based on what they claim will be their business
reaction to having a website that is “chock-full” of illegal STRs that cannot be
booked. Id. But there is no precedent for holding that a law regulating a purely
economic transaction “treats” a party to that transaction as a Section 230
“publisher” because of the party’s uncompelled business decision to remove or edit
content in response.
The STR Brokers argue that the panel decision engages in “formalistic
preemption analysis” by distinguishing between their role as “publishers” and their
role in consummating illegal economic transactions. See App. Pet., at 9. But that
distinction is inherent in Section 230. The City is not using its regulation of illegal
STR bookings as some indirect way to regulate the content of third-party STR
listings, and thus to “circumvent” Section 230. Cf. Pet. App., at 9-10. Stopping
illegal STR bookings is the whole point of the endeavor, and the City “cares not a
whit about” the decisions STR Brokers make as a publishers of listings. Airbnb,
217 F.Supp.3d at 1074. The claim that CDA preemption follows from the
Supreme Court’s decision in National Meat Association v. Harris, 565 U.S. 452,
464 (2012), in which California regulated the sale of slaughtered meats as an
indirect way to regulate slaughtering practices, is thus misplaced. 35
35

In addition to this obvious reason for distinguishing the case, the Federal Meat
Inspection Act contains a broad field preemption provision, barring states from
enacting any marking, ingredient, or labeling requirements “in addition to, or
13

Case: 18-55367, 07/11/2019, ID: 11361302, DktEntry: 109, Page 18 of 22

Next, the STR Brokers argue that because they may decide to restructure
their websites in response to Santa Monica’s regulation, their participation in
illegal bookings is protected. Their claim that “the CDA preempts local laws that
regulate ‘features that are part and parcel of the overall design and operation of a
[a] website’” and thus preempts the Ordinance because “booking services are
integral to the Platforms’ design and operation as publishers of third-party content”
is overstated and incompatible with this Court’s precedent. See App. Pet., at 12.
The case on which the STR Brokers base this argument, Jane Doe No. 1 v.
Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 22 (1st Cir. 2016), held only that
Backpage.com’s “choices about what content can appear on the website and in
what form”—its acceptance of anonymous postings and payment and its
acceptance of modified search terms like “brly legal” for example—were part of its
publisher’s role and did not permit liability for third-party content facilitating sex
trafficking.
The Ninth Circuit has made clear that a website’s “overall design and
operation” can take the website outside of Section 230 immunity, as when it
structures the website to solicit discriminatory rental criteria. Roommates.com, 521
F.3d at 1164. In that case, the website’s owner was held liable for its own actions,
not for acting as a publisher, just as the Ordinance holds STR Brokers liable for
their participation in illegal booking transactions, not for publishing STR listings.
The First Circuit did not hold that Section 230 immunized Backpages.com from

different than, those made under this chapter.” 21 U.S.C. § 678. Section 230, by
contrast, is expressly intended to co-exist with state laws that impact conduct that
takes place online but does not conflict with Section 230. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(4).
The same problem dooms the STR Brokers’ attempt to create an inter-circuit
conflict out of the ERISA preemption found in Retail Industry Leaders Association
v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2017).
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liability for actually booking transactions for underage prostitutes and taking a cut
of the money paid by the john. Nor does Section 230 reach the regulation of illegal
STR bookings here.
Ultimately, the STR Brokers’ arguments betray a lack of faith in the
“marketplaces” that they have created. The only purpose of listing STRs on
Airbnb and similar sites is so that they will be rented. If it is clear to hosts that
they do not stand to make any money by listing their illegal STRs because the
booking transaction will not go through, there is no reason why they would
continue to do so.
IV.

Section 230 Is Not A Blanket Shield for “E-Commerce.”
In the end, the STR Brokers are attempting to expand Section 230 immunity

radically by invoking “broad statements of immunity” rather than performing “a
careful exegesis of the statutory language.” Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1100. There is
nothing in the legislative history of the CDA or in its language demonstrating an
intent to shield economic transactions from regulation “magically” when they are
consummated online. See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1164.
Santa Monica is not “deputizing [the STR Brokers] to enforce local laws
requiring content removal” (Internet Assoc. Br., at 18), it is regulating their direct
participation in illegal economic transactions, just as a bricks-and-mortar rental
broker would be. The STR Brokers’ profitable “e-commerce” business models are
based on participating in economic transactions that evade the local regulations
that their traditional competitors abide by. But this is not something that Congress
intended to enable through Section 230.
That the panel’s ruling will require STR Brokers to comply with “potentially
thousands of local laws across the country” (App. Pet., at 18) is simply the result of
the STR Brokers’ national (indeed global) business model. Other companies—
Marriott and Hyatt, for example—have found ways to comply with local laws
15
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across the globe, and the STR Brokers’ exemplary engineering capacity should
enable them to do the same. Of course, if Airbnb and similar companies believe
that they are entitled to compete under special rules that ignore democratically
adopted zoning regulations, they may petition Congress or state governments for
that right. But they may not use Section 230’s decades-old, “Good Samaritan”
protection of website “publishers” to achieve that end.
CONCLUSION
The panel should deny the petition for rehearing, and the Court should deny
the petition for rehearing en banc.
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